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Abstract
We survey the recent work in AI on multi-agent reinforce-
ment learning (that is, learning in stochastic games). After
tracing a representative sample of the recent literature, we ar-
guethat, whileexciting, muchofthisworksuffersfromafun-
damental lack of clarity about the problem or problems being
addressed. We then propose ﬁve well-deﬁned problems in
multi-agent reinforcement learning and single out one that in
our view is both well-suited for AI and has not yet been ad-
equately addressed. We conclude with some remarks about
how we believe progress is to be made on this problem.
Introduction
Reinforcement learning (RL) has been an active research
area in AI for many years. Recently there has been growing
interest in extending RL to the multi-agent domain. From
the technical point of view, this has taken the community
from the realm of Markov Decision Problems (MDPs) to
the realm of game theory, and in particular stochastic (or
Markov) games (SGs).
The body of work in AI on multi-agent RL is still small,
with only a couple of dozen papers on the topic as of the
time of writing. This contrasts with the literature on single-
agent learning in AI, as well as the literature on learning
in game theory – in both cases one ﬁnds hundreds if not
thousands of articles, and several books. Despite the small
number we still cannot discuss each of these papers. In-
stead we will trace a representative historical path through
this literature. We will concentrate on what might be called
the “Bellman heritage” in multi-agent RL – work that is
based on Q-learning (Watkins & Dayan 1992), and through
it on the Bellman equations (Bellman 1957). Speciﬁcally,
we will discuss (Littman 1994; Claus & Boutilier 1998; Hu
& Wellman 1998; Bowling & Veloso 2001; Littman 2001;
Greenwald, Hall, & Serrano 2002), and in the course of an-
alyzing these papers will mention several more.
In the next section we trace the “Bellman heritage”, and
summarize the results obtained there. These results are un-
problematic for the cases of zero-sum SGs and common-
payoff (aka ‘team’, or pure-coordination) SGs, but the at-
tempt to extend them to general-sum SGs is problematic. In
Copyright c ° 2004, American Association for Artiﬁcial Intelli-
gence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.
section 3 we trace back the technical awkwardness of the
results to what we view as a misguided focus on the Nash
equilibrium as an ingredient in both the learning algorithm
and the evaluation criterion. But we believe the problem
runs deeper and has to do with a basic lack of clarity about
the exact problem being addressed. In section 4 we argue
that there are (at least) ﬁve distinct well-deﬁned problems
to be addressed, and attempt to map the existing work into
these categories. We identify one of the ﬁve that we feel is
the most interesting for AI, and note that it has barely been
addressed in that line of research. Finally, in section 5 we
make some comments on how we think one might go about
tackling it.
Bellman’s Heritage in Multi-Agent RL
In this section we review a representative sample of the lit-
erature. We start with the algorithms, and then summarize
the results reported.
Throughout, we use the following terminology and no-
tation. An (n-agent) stochastic game (SG) is a tuple
(N;S; ~ A; ~ R;T). N is a set of agents indexed 1;:::;n. S is
a set of n-agent stage games (usually thought of as games
in normal form, although see (Jehiel & Samet 2001) for
an exception). ~ A = A1;:::;An, with Ai the set of ac-
tions (or pure strategies) of agent i (note that we assume
the agent has the same strategy space in all games; this is
a notational convenience, but not a substantive restriction).
~ R = R1;:::;Rn, with Ri : S £ ~ A ! R the immedi-
ate reward function of agent i. T : S £ ~ A ! Π(S) is a
stochastic transition function, specifying the probability of
the next game to be played based on the game just played
and the actions taken in it. A Markov Decision Problem
(MDP) is a 1-agent SG; an MDP thus has the simpler struc-
ture (S;A;R;T).
From Minimax-Q to Nash-Q and Beyond
We start with the (single-agent) Q-learning algorithm
(Watkins & Dayan 1992) for computing an optimal policyin an MDP with unknown reward and transition functions:1
Q(s;a) Ã (1 ¡ ®)Q(s;a) + ®[R(s;a) + °V (s0)]
V (s) Ã max
a2A
Q(s;a)
As is well known, with certain assumptions about the way in
whichactionsareselectedateachstateovertime, Q-learning
converges to the optimal value function V ¤.
The simplest way to extend this to the multi-agent SG set-
ting is just to add a subscript to the formulation above; that
is, to have the learning agent pretend that the environment is
passive:
Qi(s;ai) Ã (1 ¡ ®)Qi(s;ai) + ®[Ri(s;~ a) + °Vi(s0)]
Vi(s) Ã max
ai2Ai
Qi(s;ai)
Several authors have tested variations of this algorithm
(e.g., (Sen, Sekaran, & Hale 1994)). However, this approach
ignores the multi-agent nature of the setting entirely. The Q-
values are updated without regard for the actions selected by
the other agents. While this can be justiﬁed when the op-
ponents’ choices of actions are stationary, it fails when an
opponent may adapt its choice of actions based on the past
history of the game.
A cure to this problem is to deﬁne the Q-values as a func-
tion of all agents’ actions:
Qi(s;~ a) Ã (1 ¡ ®)Qi(s;~ a) + ®[Ri(s;~ a) + °Vi(s0)]
We are left with the question of how to update V , given the
more complex nature of the Q-values.
For (by deﬁnition, two-player) zero-sum SGs, Littman
suggests the minimax-Q learning algorithm, in which V is
updated with the minimax of the Q values (Littman 1994):
V1(s) Ã max
P12Π(A1)
min
a22A2
X
a12A1
P1(a1)Q1(s;(a1;a2)):
Although it can be extended to general-sum SGs,
minimax-Q is no longer well motivated in those settings.
One alternative is to try to explicitly maintain a belief re-
garding the likelihood of the other agents’ policies, and up-
date V based on the induced expectation of the Q values:
Vi(s) Ã max
ai
X
a¡i2A¡i
Pi(s;a¡i)Qi(s;(ai;a¡i)):
This approach, which is in the spirit of the belief-based pro-
cedures in game theory such as ﬁctitious play (Brown 1951)
and rational learning (Kalai & Lehrer 1993), is pursued
by Claus and Boutilier (Claus & Boutilier 1998). In this
work their joint-action learners speciﬁcally adopt the belief-
maintenance procedures of ﬁctitious play, in which the prob-
ability of a given action in the next stage game is assumed to
be its past empirical frequency. Although this procedure is
well deﬁned for any general-sum game, Claus and Boutilier
1This procedure is based directly on the Bellman equations
(Bellman 1957) and the dynamic programming procedures based
on them for MDPs with known reward and transition functions.
only consider it in the context of common-payoff (or ‘team’)
games. A stage game is common-payoff if at each outcome
all agents receive the same payoff. The payoff is in general
different in different outcomes, and thus the agents’ problem
is that of coordination; indeed these are also called games of
pure coordination.
Zero-sum and common-payoff SGs have very special
properties, and, as we discuss in the next section, it is rela-
tively straightforward to understand the problem of learning
in them. The situation is different in general-sum games,
which is where the picture becomes less pretty. An early
contribution here is Nash-Q learning (Hu & Wellman 1998),
another generalization of Q-learning to general-sum games.
Nash-Q updates the V -values based on some Nash equilib-
rium in the game deﬁned by the Q-values:
Vi(s) Ã Nashi(Q1(s;~ a);:::;Qn(s;~ a)):
There is some abuse in the above notation; the expression
represents a game in which Qi(s;~ a) denotes the payoff ma-
trix to player i, and Nashi denotes “the” Nash payoff to that
player.
Of course in general there are many Nash equilibria, and
therefore the Nash payoff may not be unique. If Nash-Q
is taken to apply to all general-sum SGs, it must be inter-
preted as a nondeterministic procedure. However, the fo-
cus of Hu and Wellman has been again on a special class of
SGs. Littman articulated it most explicitly, by reinterpret-
ing Nash-Q as the Friend-or-Foe (FoF) algorithm(Littman
2001). Actually, it is more informative to view FoF as two
algorithms, each applying in a different special class of SGs.
The Friend class consists of SGs in which, throughout the
execution of the algorithm, the Q-values of the players de-
ﬁne a game in which there is a globally optimal action pro-
ﬁle (meaning that the payoff to any agent under that joint
action is no less than his payoff under any other joint ac-
tion). The Foe class is the one in which (again, throughout
the execution of the algorithm), the Q-values deﬁne a game
with a saddle point. Although deﬁned for any number of
players, for simplicity we show how the V s are updated in a
two-player game:
Friend: V1(s) Ã maxa12A1;a22A2 Q1(s;(a1;a2))
Foe: V1(s) Ã maxP12Π(A1) mina22A2 P
a12A1 P1(a1)Q1(s;(a1;a2))
Thus Friend-Q updates V similarly to regular Q-learning,
and Foe-Q updates as does minimax-Q.
Finally, Greenwald et al.’s CE-Q learning is similar to
Nash-Q, but instead uses the value of a correlated equilib-
rium to update V (Greenwald, Hall, & Serrano 2002):
Vi(s) Ã CEi(Q1(s;~ a);:::;Qn(s;~ a)):
Like Nash-Q, it requires agents to select a unique equilib-
rium payoff, an issue that the authors address explicitly by
suggesting several possible selection mechanisms.
Convergence Results
In the work referenced above, the main criteria used to mea-
sure the performance of the above algorithms was its abil-
ity to converge to an equilibrium in self-play. In (Littman& Szepesvari 1996) minimax-Q learning is proven to con-
verge in the limit to the correct Q-values for any zero-
sum game, guaranteeing convergence to a Nash equilibrium
in self-play. These results make the standard assumptions
of inﬁnite exploration and the conditions on learning rates
used in proofs of convergence for single-agent Q-learning.
Claus and Boutilier (Claus & Boutilier 1998) conjecture that
both independent Q-learners and the belief-based joint ac-
tion learners mentioned above will converge to an equilib-
rium in common payoff games under the conditions of self-
play and decreasing exploration, but do not offer a formal
proof. Nash-Qlearningwasshowntoconvergetothecorrect
Q-values for the classes of games deﬁned earlier as Friend
games and Foe games.2 Finally, CE-Q learning is shown to
converge to Nash equilibria (a subset of the set of correlated
equilibria) in a number of empirical experiments, although
there are no formal results presented.
Why Focus on Equilibria?
In the previous section we summarized the developments in
multi-agent RL without editorial comments. Here we begin
to discuss that work more critically.
The results concerning convergence of Nash-Q are quite
awkward. Nash-Q attempted to treat general-sum SGs, but
the convergence results are constrained to the cases that bear
strong similarity to the already known cases of zero-sum
games and common-payoff games. The analysis is interest-
ing in that it generalizes both conditions: The existence of
a saddle point is guaranteed in, but not limited to, zero-sum
games, and the existence of a globally optimal Nash equi-
librium payoff is guaranteed in, but not limited to, common-
payoff games. However, the conditions on the payoffs are
quite restrictive, since they must hold for the games deﬁned
by the intermediate Q-values throughout the execution of the
protocol. This makes it hard to ﬁnd any natural classes of
games that satisfy these properties beyond the two special
cases, and also difﬁcult to verify at the outset if a given game
satisﬁes the properties.
Note that like the original work on single agent Q-
learning, Nash-Q concentrates on learning the correct Q-
values, in this case for a Nash equilibrium of the game.
However, it is not obvious how to turn this into a procedure
for guiding play beyond zero-sum games. If multiple opti-
mal equilibria exist the players need an oracle to coordinate
their choices in order for play to converge to a Nash equi-
librium, which begs the question of why to use learning for
coordination at all.
Inour view, theseunsatisfying aspectsoftheBellman her-
itage from Nash-Q onwards – the weak/awkward conver-
gence assurances, the limited applicability, the assumption
of an oracle – manifest a deeper set of issues. Many of these
canbe summarized by the following question: What justiﬁes
the focus on (e.g., Nash) equilibrium?
2A certain local debate ensued regarding the initial formula-
tion of these results, which was resolved in the papers by Bowling
(Bowling 2000), Littman (Littman 2001), and by Hu and Wellman
themselves in the journal version of their article (Hu & Wellman
2002).
Nash-Q appeals to the Nash equilibrium in two ways.
First, it uses it in the execution of the algorithm. Second,
it uses convergence to it as the yardstick for evaluating the
algorithm. The former is troubling in several ways:
1. Unlike the max-min strategy, employed in minimax-Q, a
Nash-equilibrium strategy has no prescriptive force. At
best the equilibrium identiﬁes conditions under which
learning can or should stop (more on this below), but it
does not purport to say anything prior to that.
2. One manifestation of the lack of prescriptive force is the
existence of multiple equilibria; this is a thorny problem
in game theory, and limiting the focus to games with a
uniquely identiﬁed equilibrium – or assuming an oracle –
merely sweeps the problem under the rug.
3. Finally, the argument for playing an equilibrium strategy
in many games often seems dependent on the rather cir-
cular assumption that one’s opponents will also seek an
equilibrium strategy. While one might be able to justify
such an assumption if players had unbounded computa-
tional ability, even calculating a Nash equilibrium for a
large game can prove intractable.
Beside being concerned with the speciﬁc details of Nash-
Q and its descendants, we are also concerned with the use of
convergence to Nash equilibrium as the evaluation criterion.
Bowling and Veloso articulate this yardstick most clearly
(Bowling & Veloso 2001). They put forward two criteria
for any learning algorithm in a multi-agent setting: (1) The
learning should always converge to a stationary policy, and
(2) it should only terminate with a best response to the play
by the other agent(s) (a property called Hannan-consistency
in game theory (Hannan 1959)). In particular, their condi-
tions require that during self-play, learning only terminate in
a stationary Nash equilibrium. This is a useful criterion, but
it seems weak in that it ignores the fact that one is playing an
extended SG.3 We again confront the centrality of the Nash
equilibrium to game theory, and the question of whether it
should play the same central role in AI. We return to this in
the next section, but brieﬂy, in our view the answer is no.
Five Well-Deﬁned Agendas in Multi-Agent
Learning
In our view the root of the difﬁculties with the recent work
is that the ﬁeld has lacked a clearly deﬁned problem state-
ment. In this section we identify what we think is a coherent
research agenda on multi-agent RL. In fact, we generously
offer ﬁve such agendas. We also identify one of them as be-
ing, in our view, the most appropriate for AI, and the most
heretical from the game theoretic point of view.
The ﬁrst agenda is descriptive – it asks how humans learn
inthecontextofotherlearners(see, e.g., (Erev&Roth1998;
Camerer, Ho, & Chong 2002)). The name of the game
3It should be said that the literature on learning in game theory
(mostly in repeated games, a special case of SGs) revolves almost
entirely around the question of whether this or that learning pro-
cedure leads to a Nash equilibrium. In our opinion game theory is
also unclear on its motivation in doing so. We comment on this in
the next section, but this is not our focus in this article.here is to show experimentally that a certain formal model
of learning agrees with people’s behavior (typically, in lab-
oratory experiments). This work is typically undertaken
by psychologists, experimental game theorists, or other
experimentally-inclined social scientists.
The second agenda is computational in nature. It views
learning algorithms as an iterative way to compute solution
concepts. Fictitious play was originally proposed as a way
of computing a sample Nash equilibrium, and other adaptive
procedures have been proposed more recently for computing
other solution concepts (for example, computing equilibria
in local-effect games (Leyton-Brown & Tennenholtz 2003)).
Thesetendnottobethemostefﬁcientcomputationmethods,
but they do sometimes constitute quick-and-dirty methods
that can easily be understood and implemented.
The above two agendas are often intertwined within much
of the work on learning in game theory as researchers pro-
pose various dynamics that are perceived as plausible in one
sense or another (often by explaining human behavior), and
proceed to investigate whether those converge to equilibria.
This is a key concern for game theory, since a successful the-
ory would support the notion of Nash (and other kinds of)
equilibrium, which plays a central role in non-cooperative
game theory.4 The main limitation of this line of research is
that, asofnow, thereisnoagreed-uponobjectivecriterionby
which to judge the reasonableness of any given dynamics.
The other three agendas are prescriptive. They ask how
agents – people or programs - should learn. The ﬁrst of these
involves distributed control in dynamic systems. There is
sometimes a need or desire to decentralize the control of a
system operating in a dynamic environment, and in this case
the local controllers must adapt to each other’s choices. This
direction, which is most naturally modeled as a repeated or
stochastic common-payoff (or ’team’) game, has attracted
much attention in AI in recent years. Proposed approaches
can be evaluated based on the value achieved by the joint
policy and the resources required, whether in terms of com-
putation, communication, or time required to learn the pol-
icy. In this case there is no role for equilibrium analysis;
the agents have no freedom to deviate from the prescribed
algorithm. Researchers interested in this agenda have ac-
cess to a large body of existing work both within AI and
other ﬁelds such as control theory and distributed process-
ing/computation.
The two remaining prescriptive agendas both assume that
the learning takes place by self-interested agents. To un-
derstand the relationship between these two agendas, it is
worthwhile to explicitly note the following obvious fact: re-
inforcement learning – whether in a single- or multi-agent
setting – is nothing but a speciﬁc form of acting in which
the actions are conditioned on runtime observations about
the world. Thus the question of “how best to learn” is a spe-
cialized version of the general question “how best to act”.
The two remaining prescriptive agendas diverge on how
they interpret ‘best’. We call the ﬁrst the ‘equilibrium
4It has been noted that game theory is somewhat unusual, if not
unique, in having the notion of an equilibrium without associated
dynamics that give rise to the equilibrium.
agenda’. Although one could have expected a game the-
ory purist to adopt this perspective, it differs from what is
commonly studied in game theory, and in fact is explicitly
rejected in at least one place (Fudenberg & Kreps 1993).
We have only seen it pursued recently, outside game theory
(Tennenholtz 2002). The agenda can be described as fol-
lows. Since, in the traditional view of non-cooperative game
theory, the notion of optimal strategy is meaningless and is
replaced by the notions of best response and (predominantly,
Nash) equilibrium, and since a learning strategy is after all
just a strategy in an extended game, one should ask when a
vector of learning strategies (one for each agent) forms an
equilibrium. Of course, for this to be meaningful, one has
to be precise about the game being played – including the
payoff function and the information structure. In particular,
in the context of SGs, one has to specify whether the ag-
gregate payoff to an agent is the limit average, the sum of
future discounted rewards, or something else. The focus of
this agenda would most naturally seem to focus on identify-
ing what classes of learning strategies form an equilibria for
different classes of stochastic games.
The ﬁnal prescriptive agenda is one that we shall call the
‘AI agenda’, pending a more descriptive title. Again the
name could be viewed as a bit ironic since for the most part
it is not the approach taken in AI, but we do believe it is
the one that makes the most sense for the ﬁeld. This agenda
might seem somewhat less than glamorous; it asks what the
best learning strategy is for a given agent for a ﬁxed class
of the other agents in the game. It thus retains the design
stance of AI, asking how to design an optimal (or at least
effective) agent for a given environment. It just so happens
that this environment is characterized by the types of agents
inhabiting it. This does raise the question of how to param-
eterize the space of environments, and we return to that in
the next section. The objective of this agenda is to identify
effective strategies for environments of interest. A more ef-
fective strategy is one that achieves a better payoff in its en-
vironment, the selected class of opponents. The class of op-
ponents should itself be motivated as being reasonable and
containing problems of interest. Convergence to an equilib-
rium is valuable if and only if it serves the goal of maximiz-
ing payoff (again we need to be careful when discussing the
payoff for a stochastic game to specify how to aggregate the
payoffs from the individual matrix games).
We should say that the ‘AI agenda’ is in fact not as
alien to past work in multi-agent RL in AI as our discus-
sion implies. While most of the work cited earlier concen-
trates on comparing convergence rates between algorithms
in self-play, we can see some preliminary analysis compar-
ing the performance of algorithms in environments consist-
ing of other learning agents (e.g. (Hu & Wellman 2001;
2002; Stone & Littman 2001)) However, these experimen-
tal strands were not tied to a formal research agenda, and
in particular not to the convergence analyses. One striking
exception is the work by Chang and Kaelbling (Chang &
Kaelbling 2001), to which we return in the next section.
The ‘AI agenda’, however, is quite antithetical to the pre-
vailing spirit of game theory. This is precisely because it
adopts the ‘optimal agent design’ perspective and does notconsider the equilibrium concept to be central or even nec-
essarily relevant at all. The essential divergence between
the two approaches lies in their attitude towards ‘bounded
rationality’. Traditional game theory assumed it away at the
outset, positing perfect reasoning and inﬁnite mutual model-
ing of agents. It has been struggling ever since with ways to
gracefully back off from these assumptions when appropri-
ate. It’s fair to say that despite notable exceptions (cf., (Ru-
binstein 1998)), bounded rationality is a largely unsolved
problem for game theory. In contrast, the AI approach em-
braces bounded rationality as the starting point, and only
adds elements of mutual modeling when appropriate. The
result is fewer elegant theorems in general, but perhaps a
greater degree of applicability in certain cases. This applies
in general to situations with complex strategy spaces, and in
particular to multi-agent learning settings.
It should be said that although the “equilibrium agenda”
and the “AI agenda” are quite different, there are still some
areas of overlap once one looks more closely. First, as we
discussinthenextsection, inordertoparameterizethespace
of environments one must start to grapple with traditional
game theoretic notions such as type spaces. Furthermore,
when one imagines how learning algorithms might evolve
over time, one can well imagine that the algorithms evolve
towards an equilibrium, validating the ‘game theory agenda’
afterall. Whilethismayadvisethoughtsaboutthelong-term
outcome of such evolution, it stills provides no guidance for
how to behave in the short-term, prior to such a convergence.
The case of the Trading Agent Competition (TAC) serves
to illustrate the point. TAC (Wellman & Wurman 1999) is a
series of competitions in which computerized agents trade in
a non-trivial set of interacting markets. You would think that
the TAC setting would allow for application of game theo-
retic ideas. In fact, while the teams certainly gave thought to
how other teams might behave – that is, to their class of op-
ponents – the programs engaged in no computation of Nash
equilibria, no modeling of the beliefs of other agents, nor
for the most part any sophisticated attempts to send speciﬁc
signals to the other agents. The situation was sufﬁciently
complex that programs concentrated on simpler tasks such
as predicting future prices in the different markets, treating
them as external events as opposed to something inﬂuenced
by the program itself. One could reasonably argue that af-
ter each competition each team will continue to improve its
TAC agent, and eventually the agents will settle on an equi-
librium of learning strategies. Although we believe this to
be true in principle, this argument is only compelling when
the game is fairly simple and/or is played over a long time
horizon. For TAC the strategy space is so rich that this con-
vergence is unlikely to happen in our lifetime. In any case,
it provides no guidance on how to win the next competition.
Before we say a few words about the ‘AI agenda’, let
us reconsider the “Bellman heritage” discussed earlier; how
does it ﬁt into this categorization? Minimax-Q can be ﬁt into
the ‘AI agenda’, for the highly specialized case of zero-sum
games and the objective of minimizing the worst case payoff
against the set of all possible opponents. The work on self-
play in common-payoff SGs, although superﬁcially reminis-
cent of the ‘AI agenda’, probably ﬁts better with the ‘DAI
agenda’, with the payoff function interpreted as the payoff
of the agents’ designer. In general, when evaluating perfor-
mance in self-play, a separate argument would seem to be
required as to why that would be a reasonable class of oppo-
nents to expect. Nash-Q and its descendants feel somewhat
like followers of the ‘equilibrium agenda’ although for a re-
stricted set of the equilibria in stochastic games. They fail to
resonate with the ‘AI agenda’ since it is unclear what class
of environments they might achieve a good payoff within.
Pursuing the ‘AI agenda’
The ‘AI agenda’ calls for categorizing strategic environ-
ments, that is, populations of agent types with which the
agent being designed might interact. These agent types may
come with a distribution over them, in which case one can
hope to design an agent with maximal expected payoff, or
without such a distribution, in which case a different objec-
tive is called for (for example, an agent with maximal min-
imum payoff). In either case we need a way to speak about
agent types. The question is how to best represent mean-
ingful classes of agents, and then use this representation to
calculate a best response.
We won’t have much to say about the best-response calcu-
lation, except to note that it is computationally a hard prob-
lem. For example, it is known that in general the best re-
sponse in even a two-player SG is non-computable (Nach-
bar & Zame 1996). We will however touch on the question
of how to parameterize the space of agents, which is itself a
challenge. Our objective is not to propose a speciﬁc taxon-
omy of agent types, but instead to provide guidance for the
construction of useful taxonomies for different settings.
Agents are categorized by their strategy space. Since the
space of all strategies is complex, this categorization is not
trivial. One coarse way of limiting a strategy space is to
simply restrict it to a family. For example, we might assume
that the agent belongs to the class of joint-action learners in
the sense of (Claus & Boutilier 1998). Another, in principle
orthogonal, way of restricting the strategy space is to place
computational limitations on the agents. For example, we
might constrain them to be ﬁnite automata with a bounded
number of states.5 Even after these kinds of limitations we
might still be left with too large a space to reason about,
but there are further disciplined approaches to winnowing
down the space. In particular, when the strategies of the
opponent are a function of its beliefs, we can make restrict-
ing assumptions about those beliefs. This is the approach
taken by Chang and Kaelbling (Chang & Kaelbling 2001),
and to some extent (Stone & Littman 2001), although they
both look at a rather limited set of possible strategies and
beliefs. A more general example would be to assume that
the opponent is a ‘rational learner’ in the sense of (Kalai
& Lehrer 1993), and to place restrictions on its prior about
5This is the model commonly pursued in the work on ‘bounded
rationality’ (e.g., (Neyman 1985; Papadimitriou & Yannakakis
1994; Rubinstein 1998)). Most of that work however is concerned
with how equilibrium analysis is impacted by these limitations, so
it’s not clear whether the technical results obtained there will di-
rectly contribute to the ‘AI agenda.’other agents’ strategies. Note though that this is a slippery
slope, since it asks not only about the second agent’s compu-
tational limitations and strategy space, but also recursively
about his beliefs about the ﬁrst agent’s computational pow-
ers, strategy space, and beliefs. This brings us into the realm
of type spaces (e.g., (Mertens & Zamir 1985)), but the in-
teraction between type spaces and bounded rationality is un-
chartered territory (though see (Gmytrasiewicz, Durfee, &
Wehe 1991)).
There is much more research to be done on weaving these
different considerations into a coherent and comprehensive
agent taxonomy. We will not settle this open problem, but
will instead focus brieﬂy on the question of how best to eval-
uate competing methods once an environment has been de-
ﬁned. In recent work (Powers & Shoham 2005), we have at-
temptedtodeﬁneasetofcriteriatoguidefurthereffortinde-
signing learning algorithms for stochastic games. These cri-
teria set requirements on the minimal payoff to be achieved
againstseveralclassesofopponents. Inparticularwerequire
that an algorithm deﬁne a target set against which it is re-
quired to achieve an ²-optimal payoff, while simultaneously
guaranteeing that it achieves at least the payoff of the secu-
rity level strategy minus ² against any opponent. We demon-
strate an algorithm that provably meets these criteria when
the target set is the class of opponents whose actions are in-
dependent of the game history. Though we are continuing to
develop algorithms that perform optimally versus more in-
triguing sets of opponents, ultimately an environment of in-
terest is the set of existing multi-agent learning algorithms.
Although this set is too diverse to easily ﬁt within a spe-
ciﬁc formally deﬁned class of opponents, we can strive to
approximate it by sampling. Towards this end, we imple-
mented a wide variety of these algorithms, including many
of those described in this paper as well as others from the
game theory literature. Within this empirical environment,
we were able to compare the performance of each of the al-
gorithms and display both highly competitive performance
for our new algorithm and a method for empirical testing in
line with the ‘AI agenda’ as we see it.
One of the interesting observations that came out of
this tournament setting is that more complicated algorithms
aren’t necessarily more effective when evaluated in an envi-
ronment of other adaptive agents. In a multi-agent setting,
learning and teaching are inseparable. Any choice agent i
makes is both informed by agent j’s past behavior and im-
pacts agent j0s future behavior. For this reason, the neutral
term ‘multi-agent adaptation’ might have been more apt. It
doesn’t have quite the ring of ‘multi-agent learning’ so we
will not wage that linguistic battle, but it is useful to keep the
symmetric view in mind when thinking about how to pursue
the ‘AI agenda’. In particular, it helps explain why greater
sophistication is not always an asset. For example, consider
an inﬁnitely repeated game of ‘chicken’:
yield dare
yield 2,2 1,3
dare 3,1 0,0
In the presence of any opponent who attempts to learn the
other agent’s strategy and play a best response (for exam-
ple, using ﬁctitious play or the system in (Claus & Boutilier
1998)), the best strategy for an agent is to play the stationary
policy of always daring; the other agent will soon learn to al-
ways yield. This is the “watch out I’m crazy” policy, Stone
and Littman’s “bully strategy” (Stone & Littman 2001), or
Oscar Wilde’s “tyranny of the weak”. But notice that the
success of this simple strategy is a function of its environ-
ment, whenitcompetesagainstotheragentswhoarealsous-
ing this same strategy it tends to fare abysmally, once again
emphasizing the importance of specifying the class of oppo-
nents one wishes to perform well against.
Concluding Remarks
Wehavereviewedpreviousworkinmulti-agentRLandhave
argued for what we believe is a clear and fruitful research
agenda in AI on multi-agent learning. Since we have made
some critical remarks of previous work, this might give the
impression that we don’t appreciate it or the researchers be-
hind it. Nothing could be further from the truth. Some of
our best friends and colleagues belong to this group, and we
have been greatly educated and inspired by their ideas. We
look forward to the new and innovative results we are sure
to see in the ﬁeld and hope our comments may contribute to
a healthy debate as we work together towards that goal.
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